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Abstract 
Low-carbon electricity is a key enabler in combating climate change. Decarbonising the power sector is 
now at the centre of global and European policies. As the IPCC highlights, pathways where the power 
sector rapidly decarbonises by 2030 have higher chances of keeping global warming below 1.5°C. The 
electricity sector should be fully decarbonised by 2050 to meet either the 1.5°C or 2°C targets. This 
means that EU policy efforts should focus on supporting a maximum reduction of emissions per unit of 
electricity by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050. Reaching these targets is one of the most pressing 
questions EU policymakers face today. In light of the COVID-19 crisis, EU policies should guide a cost-
effective, reliable and environmentally sound transition of the power sector, benefiting EU research and 
innovation and its citizens. This meta-analysis provides a novel view on historical data and compares data 
from modelling scenarios identified in the literature. It assesses the current and future role of nuclear 
energy in decarbonizing the EU power sector, while reviewing socio-economic implications that could 
arise if limited public support nearly excludes nuclear fission electricity from the future EU power mix. 
This work highlights relevant socio-economic policy implications and actionable policy 
recommendations. 
Keywords: EU energy policy; Electrification; power sector decarbonisation; Nuclear energy; Socio-
economic costs 
1 Introduction 
The Paris Agreement1 represents the global effort to combat climate change with a central aim to keep 
global warming this century well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, while pursuing efforts to limit 
warming to 1.5°C. A recent IPCC report has however revealed that the current post-2020 pledges of the 
signatories deviate from the 2°C-consistent pathways and are broadly aligned with a warming of about 
3°C by 2100 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018) and a potential global emissions peak at 
51 GtCO2e/year as early as 2025 (Kitous et al., 2017). More importantly, the report states that if the 2030 
global emissions estimated under the current pathways are reached, limiting warming to 1.5°C would not 
                                                     




be possible thereafter, even with additional steeper emissions reductions. Global emissions should start 
declining well before 2030 in order to avoid overshoot. Delayed action risks cost escalation, lock-in 
carbon-emitting infrastructure, stranded assets, and reduced flexibility in the long-term response options 
(Capros et al., 2014; European Commission, 2018). This message is especially important for the 
European Union (EU), where future dependence on large-scale deployment of carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technologies is becoming increasingly uncertain: their cost-effectiveness is yet to be proven as 
none of the CCS projects that received EU funding has so far achieved the intended progress in 
demonstrating the technology at commercial scale (European Court of Auditors, 2018).  
The IPCC report further highlights that pathways with higher chances of keeping warming this century to 
below 1.5°C show a rapid decarbonisation of the power sector by 2030 and around mid-century the sector 
should be essentially fully decarbonised to meet either the 1.5°C or the 2°C target (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2018). Consequently, this means that the EU should target a net-zero emissions 
electricity by 2050 and at the same time prioritise efforts to maximize the sector’s emissions reduction by 
2030. Reaching these targets has become one of the most-pressing questions that EU policymakers face 
today and in-light of the COVID-19 crisis, it is imminent that policies guide a cost-effective, reliable, 
energy-efficient and environmentally-sound transition of the power sector, bringing an added value to 
research and innovation and society at large. 
To date, the EU has set some of the most ambitious energy and climate policy frameworks (European 
Commission, 2016a) and aims to commit to climate-neutrality by 2050 (European Commission, 2020), an 
objective that is at the heart of the EU Green Deal (European Commission, 2019a). The European 
Commission (EC) has therefore developed a set of medium- and long-term scenarios to allow policy 
makers to assess the potential medium- and long-term impacts of the current policy framework and assess 
policy proposals for achieving the EU’s climate and energy targets for 2030 and 2050 (Capros et al., 
2016; E3MLab, 2019; E3MLab and IIASA, 2016). Aside from these technical reports, there exists no in-
depth analysis on the economic, energy and environmental impacts for the EC medium-term scenarios, 
especially one that compares medium-term scenario projections to the EU’s decarbonisation and energy 
transformation trends to date. 
On the contrary, there exist comprehensive analyses for the long-term projections under the current EU 
policy framework as well as the projected impacts of the various long-term scenarios reflecting specific 
policy pathways (Capros et al., 2016, 2014; European Commission, 2018; Knopf et al., 2015). These 
reports include in-depth analyses of the energy and emission-related impacts by sector and by policy 
scenario, including assessments of some socio-economic aspects such as investment needs and energy-
system costs and prices. However, the assumptions and boundary conditions of both the medium- and 
long-term EC scenarios reflect technology-specific energy and climate targets and consider particular 
policy incentives for renewable energy sources (RES), such as feed-in tariffs or green certificates, which 
can influence the interplay of technologies in the modelling and in turn the cost-effectiveness of the 
resulting power-mix. It has been shown compared to these approaches that, policy routes designed to 
achieve cost-effective decarbonisation of the EU power sector while supporting less technology-specific 
targets and excluding RES policy incentives, would yield substantially different EU power-generation 
mixes both in the medium- and long-term (Simoes et al., 2017). In particular, among the policy routes 
investigated, the one that could yield the highest impact on the cost-effective decarbonisation of the EU 
power-mix, was when social acceptance for nuclear electricity was assumed to be higher: lifting 
restrictions to the deployment of new nuclear power plants (NPP) led to a cost-effective power mix with 
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the largest amount of electricity production by 2050 due to the significant increases in future nuclear 
power generation. Interestingly, the study also revealed that the policy route that could have the second 
highest impact on the decarbonisation of the EU power-mix would assume a higher potential for solar and 
wind power generation, which would require increasing the number of available RES sites and improving 
the reliability of transmission and distribution, factors which both reflect public acceptance to perceived 
technology risks, land use change and energy security concerns. These results imply that there exist socio-
economic aspects and policy incentives with an exogenous influence on the EU power-mix scenarios that 
could have implications for the role of nuclear power and the power-system’s cost-effective 
decarbonisation, which require further investigation.  
In addition, socio-economic externalities (European Commission, 2003), such as those related to human 
health-related impacts (cf. toxicity or accidents), climate change, the availability of land, public 
acceptance, or competitiveness of EU-located electricity production compared to imports that could arise 
from the energy transition, are not fully captured by modelling scenarios.2 Many studies have highlighted 
the wide and contrasting estimates of electricity generation costs for the various technologies and main 
factors identified are the inconsistent usage of terms and the differences in the cost elements assessed in 
the overall power system costs (Bustreo et al., 2017; D’haeseleer, 2013; NEA, 2018). These 
inconsistencies restrict coherent comparisons among technologies and could result in a significant over- 
or under-estimation of the efficiency of the power system in terms of cost, environmental and social 
performance, as well as its flexibility, reliability and resilience. 
This work aims to complement the understanding of the policy implications of the EU energy and climate 
policy framework by highlighting possible emerging economic, social and environmental aspects, 
focusing on the growing importance of the EU power sector mid- and long-term decarbonisation. 
Through a meta-analysis that provides a novel view on available historical data, as well as on comparing 
data from modelling scenarios identified in literature, it sheds light to the central role of electricity in 
decarbonising the EU economy and to the current and future contribution of nuclear power as a source of 
low-carbon and energy-dense technology, while identifying relevant socio-economic policy implications 
and supporting actionable policy recommendations. 
After briefly presenting the data sources and modelling scenarios (Section 2), the paper first analyses 
historical trends observed in the EU to date focusing on the dimensions of energy security, emissions and 
decarbonisation costs (Section 3). It then investigates possible medium- and long-term implications that 
can be identified along these dimensions from the various EC policy pathways and draws links to 
alternative, less-technology specific, policy pathways, where nuclear power could have a less, or more 
prominent role in the provision of electricity (Section 4). Some potential socio-economic implications are 
further presented in this section, and the following section (Section 5) provides a complementary 
discussion on potential policy-related implications with respect to assessing full-system costs of 
electricity generation technologies including those on climate change, human toxicity, and agricultural 
land use, depletion of energy resources, nuclear accidents and other. Finally, the main conclusions from 
this analysis are drawn, summarising key implications and discussing relevant policy recommendations 
(Section 6).  
                                                     
2 It should be noted that macro-economic modelling was also undertaken to estimate the impacts of the scenarios on 
GDP growth and jobs (E3MLab, 2016; Lewney et al., 2017). 
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2 Modelling Scenarios and Data 
The analysis is divided into two sections. The first (Section 3) focuses on investigating the EU 
decarbonisation and energy transformation trends to date based on historical data retrieved from the 
official, open, and databases of Eurostat, European Commission, United Nations, World Bank, 
International Energy Agency and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Energy, 2020; Eurostat, 2020; Gütschow, et al., 2019; International Energy 
Agency, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020; United Nations, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2019; World Bank, 2020). The data retrieved were 
along the dimensions energy security, emissions and decarbonisation costs and included values on energy 
consumption, GDP, emissions, net-imports and relevant shares across energy fuels and sectors. Since data 
were available from different data sources, in order to retain data consistency and be in-line with the 
policy frameworks and modelling results, a timeline between 1990 and 2017 using a one-year step, was 
selected for the total of EU-28 member states at the time the analysis was performed. Complementary 
data on electricity prices and costs are derived from official EC published documents (European 
Commission, 2019b, 2016b) and the relevant supporting study on behalf of EC (Rademaekers et al., 
2018). The second section explores the EU28 decarbonisation projections from different medium- (by 
2030) and long-term (by 2050) scenarios along the dimensions of energy security, emissions and 
decarbonisation costs in the EU28, with a particular focus on the EU power sector and the projected role 
of nuclear power. 
First, published data from EC modelling studies are analysed (E3MLab, 2019; E3MLab and IIASA, 2016; 
European Commission, 2019c), which were developed as a set of medium- and long-term scenarios, in an 
effort to assess the potential impact of achieving the EU’s climate and energy targets for 2030 and 2050. 
The EC scenarios represent trend projections3, with the EU Reference Scenario 2016 (REF2016) acting as 
a benchmark of policy and market trends against which several policy proposals were assessed. This 
scenario has the longest modelling horizon, up to 2050, with projections starting in 2015 using a 5-year-
step, while assuming that the legally binding targets of the 2020 Climate and Energy Package are 
achieved and that the EU and Member State policies agreed until December 20154 are implemented 
(Capros et al., 2016). 
The seven mid-term scenarios, called EUCO, have been developed based on the REF2016 policy 
framework, but include additional policies and incentives across all Member States in order to assess the 
potential impact of achieving the EU’s climate and energy targets by 2030 (E3MLab, 2019; E3MLab and 
IIASA, 2016):  
                                                     
3 Trend projections that represent hypothetical, “what-if” scenarios, as a set of assumptions are made to address 
several unknowns ranging from population growth, macroeconomic and fossil fuel price developments, technology 
improvements, as well as the degree of policy implementation across the EU. On the contrary, forecasts would 
represent best estimates of future results and the most-likely scenario assumptions. 
4 Include the legally binding 2020 targets and EU legislation, the EU Emissions Trading System Directive (including 
the Market Stability Reserve), the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, Regulations on eco-design and on 
CO2 emission standards for cars and vans, as well as the revised F-gas (i.e. fluorinated greenhouse gases) 
Regulation. It also takes into consideration the Member States’ explicit phase-out policies and ongoing projects at 
the time of modelling but does not incorporate the, at the time, politically agreed but not legally adopted, 2030 
climate and energy targets. 
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 The EUCO27 and the EUCO30 target an at least 40% reduction in GHG emissions compared to 
1990, with a 27% RES share in final energy use and a 27% and 30% energy efficiency target 
respectively (compared to 2007). 
 The EUCO3030 and the three EUCO+ scenarios built on the EUCO30 to assess the potential 
impacts of more ambitious targets: EUCO3030 assesses a higher penetration of renewable energy 
of 30%, hence achieving a 43% GHG emissions reduction and the EUCO+33, EUCO+35 and 
EUCO+40 explore more ambitious energy efficiency targets of 33%, 35% and 40% respectively 
with a 28% RES share, thus reaching a GHG emissions reduction between 43% and 47%. 
 The EUCO3232.5 is the most recent scenario that assess a raised 2030 target of energy efficiency 
to 32.5% and a RES share of 32%, as agreed in the ‘Clean energy for all Europeans package’, 
thus reaching one of the highest reductions in GHG emissions of 46%.  
In addition, eight long-term, economy-wide scenarios, have been developed based on a “Baseline” policy 
framework that keeps the macro-economic projections, fuel price developments and pre-2015 Member 
States policies of the REF2016, but updates the technology pathways (De Vita et al., 2018), as well as 
projects the achievement of the 2030 energy and climate targets, thus are more comparable to the 
EUCO3232.5 pathway. These long-term scenarios target a GHG emissions reduction by 2050 ranging 
from -80% to -100% compared to 1990, while considering specific technology portfolios and assuming 
their deployment is intensified after 2030 (European Commission, 2018):  
 Five scenarios target an 80% reduction of GHG emissions by 2050, of which Electrification 
(ELEC), Hydrogen (H2) and E-fuels (P2X) focus on switching fossil fuels to zero/carbon-
neutral energy resources, whereas the Energy Efficiency (EE) and the Circular Economy 
(CIRC) explore more ambitious energy savings measures and a transition to a circular economy 
respectively.  
 The Combo scenario, combines the above five scenarios without any predefined emissions 
reduction target for 2050, thus achieving close to 90% reduction in emissions by 2050. 
 The 1.5TECH and 1.5LIFE scenarios target net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 (including land-
use, land-use change and forestry), with the former relying more heavily on the intensification of 
the above technologies including the deployment of carbon-capture and storage technologies 
whereas the latter relies less on technological options and more on sustainable lifestyle changes 
e.g. increased climate awareness, carbon intensive diets, limiting growth of air transport demand 
etc. 
 
As highlighted in the introduction, the above EC scenarios reflect technology-specific energy and climate 
targets and consider particular policy incentives for renewable energy sources (RES), all of which could 
influence the interplay of technologies in the power-mix and could in turn impact the EU power-system’s 
cost-effective decarbonisation. To explore such implications, the role of nuclear power in the cost-
effective decarbonisation of the EU power mix is explored based on data from a recent modelling study 
reflecting different levels of nuclear social acceptance (FTI Consulting, 2018).5 The study covered three 
                                                     
5 Assumes technology improvements based on the EC reference assumptions on electricity costs and performances, 
capital and operational expenditure based on latest data from EC and E3M, fuel commodity prices from IEA World 
Energy Outlook 2017, the CO2 EUA to converge to EUCO33 by 2025 and EUCO30 by 2030/5, as well as outlook 
for new and existing Interconnections from the ENTSOE TYNDO 2018 Outlook.  
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potential nuclear capacity scenarios for 2050, 150 GW (High), 103 GW (Medium) and 36 GW (Low), 
that reflect policy pathways of low towards higher social acceptance for nuclear power, considering as a 
base the current 2050 decarbonisation targets and the ‘Clean energy for all Europeans package’ 2030 
targets of at least 40% and 85% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and 2050 respectively, compared to 
1990 (similar to the EUCO33 scenario). This analysis focuses on assessing the potential medium-term 
and long-term (by 2050) impacts under three dimensions of energy security of supply, emissions 
reduction, and decarbonisation costs that are associated with the two extreme 2050 scenarios as follows: 
a) the low nuclear capacity scenario represents a case where most of the existing plants close 
without further extensions and new projects fail to conclude, resulting in 36 GW of nuclear 
installed capacity by 2050;  
b) high nuclear capacity scenario, models long-term operation extensions and building new plants 
in line with current advanced projects, as well as considers the commissioning of a number of 
additional plants (including about 5GW of SMR and <1GW of Gen-IV) that replace thermal 
baseload power plants, resulting in 150 GW of nuclear installed capacity by 2050. 
3 Analysis of the EU Decarbonisation and Energy Transformation Trends 
Emissions, Energy Consumption and Import Dependency in the EU 
As illustrated in Figure 1, in contrast with worldwide trends, the EU economy has already started to 
modernise and transform, having experience a growth of over 60% since 1990, while at the same time 
reducing its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 23%. However, definite conclusions cannot be drawn 
based on the latest available data, since the strongest reduction in emissions coincided with the period of 
2007-2014 of the global financial and eurozone crises and from 2014 annual emissions have remained 
relatively constant. Furthermore, decoupling energy use and economic growth has shown to be a greater 
challenge, as annual energy consumption has mostly displayed an upward trend from 1990 onwards, with 
exception again the period coinciding with the financial crises. In addition, detailed look at the four 
sectors responsible for over 95% of EU’s final energy use (Figure 2) reveals that compared to the 1990 
levels, only industry has reduced its final energy use (-23%), while both transport and services have 1.3 
times higher overall energy use compared to 1990 and only in households it increased marginally 
(+3.4%). Again, as of 2014, energy consumption has been experiencing again an upward trend in all 
sectors, except the residential one.  
Figure 3 clearly shows that EU’s import dependency has been mostly rising and the EU turned into a net-
energy importer since the early 2000s, with a dependency reaching nearly 56 % in 2017. This trend is 
linked to the increase in natural gas dependency, as net imports of natural gas have more than doubled 
since 1990 and consumption increased by 32%.6 
 
                                                     
6 Taking into consideration that both oil and petroleum as well as solid fossil fuel net-imports remained at close to 




Figure 1: The global and EU28 annual change of energy consumption and GHG emissions compared to GDP growth for the 
period of 1990 to 2017 [based on data for GDP (World Bank, 2020), for emissions (Gütschow, et al., 2019) and for energy 
consumption (Eurostat, 2020; International Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020)] 
 
Figure 2: The EU28 annual change in final energy consumption and GDP by sector between 1990 and 2017 [based on data for 
GDP (World Bank, 2020), and for energy consumption (European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, 2020)] 
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Electrification and the Role of Nuclear 
The shares of electricity, natural gas and renewable heat & biofuels in the final energy use have increased 
compared to 1990, whereas those of fossil fuels decreased (Figure 4). Electricity is now the second most 
important energy fuel, together with natural gas, and it has also experienced the second-highest growth 
compared to 1990 (after renewable heat & biofuels), as a result of its increased use in industry and  
buildings (Figure 5), indicating the strong electrification of these two sectors. The industry sector was 
also the only sector that experienced a large drop in GHG emissions compared to 19907 (Figure 6), yet it 
is still the largest contributor of GHGs emissions (50%), and electricity and heat production activities 
retain by far the largest share, which has even slightly increased. 
Interestingly, decarbonisation of electricity has been slower than the decarbonisation of manufacturing 
and construction and of fuel and petroleum refinement, despite electricity being increasingly generated by 
low-carbon technologies, with shares up to 56% in 2017, compared to 43% in 1990 (Figure 7). Nuclear 
technologies remain the most important source of low-carbon electricity, contributing almost half of it 
(45%) and accounting for only 11% of the total installed power capacity. The remaining half of low-
carbon electricity is generated by RES which however add-up to four times the installed capacity of 
nuclear power. In addition, looking at the overall trends between 1990 and 2017, the shares of installed 
capacity of low-carbon generation technologies increased by 136%, owed, almost entirely, to new wind 
and solar power capacities (Table 1: Comparison of the EU28 gross electricity generation, installed generation capacity 
and operating hours by resource and technology between 1990 and 2017 [estimated based on data from (European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Energy, 2020)] 
 
Electricity Costs and Prices  
According to published figures (European Commission, 2016b), electricity has held on average the 
highest share in energy-related household expenditures,  which has been roughly half of the energy bill of 
an average EU household (European Commission, 2019b). Wholesale electricity prices, have displayed 
significant volatility over the last decade (e.g. 30 EUR’17/MWh in spring 2016 and 60 EUR’17/MWh in 
August 2018). These have been attributed to seasonality (i.e. wintertime vs. summertime) and variations 
in the generation mix, and as a result also to electricity production subsidies that influenced the electricity 
                                                     
7 Referring to the GHG emissions resulting from the combustion of fossil fuels, which comprise ¾ of EU’s GHG 
emissions. They include the GHG emissions from international aviation but exclude those from land use, land-use 
change, and forestry (LULUCF), as well as from international maritime 
1990 2017 1990 2017 1990 2017
Combustible fuels 1467060 1433590 331479 461069 4426 3109
Nuclear 794860 829720 121770 120885 6528 6864
Hydro 308710 331240 125327 155256 2463 2134
Wind 780 361940 454 168514 1718 2148
Solar 20 119400 11 109001 1818 1095
Geothermal & other RES (tidal) 3730 7250 739 1091 5047 6648








generation mix, since without these subsidies less RES capacity would have been installed in many EU 
countries over the past 10 years (European Commission, 2019d). On the other hand, and with exception 
large industrial consumers, retail prices grew by almost 20% for households and medium-sized industries 
between 2008 and 2017 (from 166 and 87 to 195 and 103 EUR’17/MWh respectively) (European 
Commission, 2019b). Similarly, these were heavily impacted by policy support costs and fiscal 
instruments, which changed significantly the price composition since 2008, in particular with respect to 
the share of taxes that almost doubled. The main driver for this increase in taxes was the support towards 
RES and combined-heat and power (CHP) generation, which, depending on the consumer’s status, 
represented about 30-64% of the taxes and 12-24% of the average total electricity price, whereas the 
support for the nuclear sector was less than 1% of the price. Furthermore, the annual energy-related 
subsidies increased by 12% between 2008-2016, of which half were dedicated to support RES (with a 
threefold increase, reaching 76 billion EUR’17), 1/3 to fossil fuels and just 3% to nuclear (among the 
lowest at approximately 5 billion EUR’17); the remaining were dedicated to electricity, energy efficiency 
measures and heating and cooling (Rademaekers et al., 2018).  
), yet the generation of low-carbon electricity increased by just 65%. This is expected as power generation 
by variable and intermittent RES (i.e. solar and wind) is highly depended on climate-related conditions 
(i.e. availability of wind and sun). These low-carbon technologies, together with hydropower, operated 
1/3 to 1/6 of the time compared to nuclear power and the remaining time were idle.8 Overall these trends 
translate to a smaller production of decarbonised electricity per area (i.e. the installed capacity 
representing a proxy of the area required) and to a higher underutilisation of facilities and hence 
investments.  
 
Figure 3: The EU28 annual change in import dependency compared to the net imports (left) and gross inland consumption (right) 
by energy source between 1990 and 2017 [estimated based on data from (European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, 
2020)] 
                                                     
8 It should be noted that the operation of dispatchable power plants, and hence their capacity factors (also called load 
factors), can be further constrained by market forces, as the distribution system operator might give priority to 
generating installations using renewable energy sources, waste or CHP, according to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2019). Among the typical dispatchable generating plants 





Figure 4: Comparison of the 1990 and 2017 shares (%) of energy fuels (i.e. resources and carriers) in the total final energy 
consumption of the EU28 [estimated based on data from (European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, 2020)] 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of the EU28 sectoral shares (%) of final energy consumption between 1990 and 2017 by fuel type [based 




Figure 6: Comparison of the 1990 and 2017 sectoral shares (%) of GHG emissions in the EU28 [estimated based on data from 
(European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, 2020)] 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of the EU28 shares of gross electricity generation and installed generation capacity by source between 
1990 and 2017 [estimated based on data from (European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, 2020)] 
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Table 1: Comparison of the EU28 gross electricity generation, installed generation capacity and operating hours by resource and 
technology between 1990 and 2017 [estimated based on data from (European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, 
2020)] 
 
Electricity Costs and Prices  
According to published figures (European Commission, 2016b), electricity has held on average the 
highest share in energy-related household expenditures,9  which has been roughly half of the energy bill 
of an average EU household (European Commission, 2019b).10 Wholesale electricity prices, have 
displayed significant volatility over the last decade (e.g. 30 EUR’17/MWh in spring 2016 and 60 
EUR’17/MWh in August 2018).11 These have been attributed to seasonality (i.e. wintertime vs. 
summertime) and variations in the generation mix,12 and as a result also to electricity production subsidies 
that influenced the electricity generation mix, since without these subsidies less RES capacity would have 
been installed in many EU countries over the past 10 years (European Commission, 2019d). On the other 
hand, and with exception large industrial consumers, retail prices grew by almost 20% for households and 
medium-sized industries between 2008 and 2017 (from 166 and 87 to 195 and 103 EUR’17/MWh 
respectively) (European Commission, 2019b).13 Similarly, these were heavily impacted by policy support 
costs and fiscal instruments, which changed significantly the price composition since 2008, in particular 
with respect to the share of taxes that almost doubled. The main driver for this increase in taxes was the 
support towards RES and combined-heat and power (CHP) generation14, which, depending on the 
consumer’s status, represented about 30-64% of the taxes and 12-24% of the average total electricity 
price, whereas the support for the nuclear sector was less than 1% of the price. Furthermore, the annual 
energy-related subsidies increased by 12% between 2008-2016, of which half were dedicated to support 
                                                     
9 In comparison with gas, solid and liquid fuels, and heating but excluding transport expenditures, based on. 
10 Since these are average values, it is important to note that large differences are observed across the EU on both the 
absolute expenditures, the share of energy in the total expenditure and the role of different household energy 
products. 
11 All prices are expressed in constant EUR of the year 2017. 
12 Since the marginal costs of generation technologies have been dominated by the higher coal and natural gas 
prices. Marginal costs refer to the incremental cost of producing one more unit of electricity and reflect the change 
in the total cost. 
13 Large industry consumers pay lower taxes due to partial exemptions from levies according to the Energy and 
Environment State Aid Guidelines (EEAG). 
14 This considers only policy support costs that directly impact retail prices and not every tax sub-component 
existing in each Member State. 
1990 2017 1990 2017 1990 2017
Combustible fuels 1467060 1433590 331479 461069 4426 3109
Nuclear 794860 829720 121770 120885 6528 6864
Hydro 308710 331240 125327 155256 2463 2134
Wind 780 361940 454 168514 1718 2148
Solar 20 119400 11 109001 1818 1095
Geothermal & other RES (tidal) 3730 7250 739 1091 5047 6648








RES (with a threefold increase, reaching 76 billion EUR’17), 1/3 to fossil fuels and just 3% to nuclear 
(among the lowest at approximately 5 billion EUR’17); the remaining were dedicated to electricity, 




4 Comparison of Medium- and Long-term Decarbonisation Scenarios and 
Possible Socio-economic Implications  
4.1 The 2030 Scenarios and the Role of Nuclear 
Energy Security of Supply and Emissions Reduction 
All EC mid-term scenarios model a drop in the gross energy demand, with RES playing a more 
significant role driven by the 2030 targets, while the importance of natural gas and nuclear is projected to 
remain relatively stable and of fossil fuels to decrease (Figure 8). As expected, a reduction in the gross 
energy demand would reduce net energy imports, yet the EU is projected to remain a net importer until 
2030, with import dependency above 50%, even in the EUCO3232.5 scenario. This can be attributed to 
the projected increase in natural gas imports to 1.2-2 times above the 1990 levels, accounting for 1/4 to 
1/3 of the total net imports by 2030, depending on the scenario.  
 
Figure 8: Mid-term projections (in 2030) of the gross inland consumption (excluding non-energy uses of energy resources and the 
consumption of the energy sector itself) and the net imports compared to 1990 in the EU28 [estimated based on data from 
(E3MLab, 2019; E3MLab and IIASA, 2016; European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, 2020)] 
Electricity is the only energy fuel projected to further increase its share in the final energy use, remaining 
the second most important energy fuel (Figure 9 compared to Figure 4). Focusing on the EUCO3232.5 
scenario, which represents more closely the current EU current policy framework, electricity is expected 
to continue decarbonising: low-carbon generation would increase by 30% by 2030 compared to 2017, yet 
low-carbon power capacity would increase by 125% (Figure 10 and Figure 7). The role of nuclear power 
in decarbonising electricity would remain significant, being its second largest contributor despite a 
projected reduction of nearly 10% in its installed capacity compared to 2017. It can be estimated from the 
figure, that by 2030 the projected installed capacity for RES would be 4 times that of nuclear, to generate 
an equivalent amount of low-carbon electricity. This observation is in line with the historical trends 
analysed in Section 2 and no significant change in the operating hours has been noticed since 2017. 
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Moreover, despite the significant changes in the power-generation mix that target a large drop in 
emissions by 2030, electricity & heat is projected to be the second largest emitter, accounting for about 
27% of all energy-related CO2 emissions (Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 9: Mid-term projections (in 2030) of the shares of energy fuels (i.e. resources and carriers) in the final energy use in the 
EU28 [based on data from (Capros et al., 2016; E3MLab, 2019; E3MLab and IIASA, 2016)] 
Analysing the potential medium-term implications of a policy pathway of low social acceptance for 
nuclear power as compared to a pathway of high social acceptance (FTI Consulting, 2018), indicates a 
required increase in thermal installed capacity of 27 GW in order to compensate for the loss in nuclear 
installed capacity, of which about 2/3 would be for new infrastructure and the remaining extensions to 
existing carbon-intensive units. This change in the power generation mix is projected to bring an increase 
in fossil-fuel consumption of 5’112 TWh, (53% natural gas and 47% coal) and result in a missed 
opportunity to achieve an additional reduction in CO2 emissions of 1971 Mt by 2030. Such differences in 
infrastructure investments would risk carbon lock-in, stranded assets and heighten EU’s energy 
dependence for the coming decades, whereas reaching a higher level of emissions in the mid-term, would 
not allow the EU to achieved its full potential by 2030, and at the same time could hinder EU’s long-term 
decarbonisation transition before the roll-out of RES and storage, putting an upward pressure on EU ETS 





Figure 10: Mid-term projections (in 2030) of the electricity generation and net-generation capacity by technology in the EU28 
[estimated based on data from (Capros et al., 2016; E3MLab, 2019)] 
Decarbonisation Costs  
In terms of electricity production costs, all scenarios project them to peak in the 2020s15 and subsequently 
slightly drop in the 2030s (Table 2).16 Yet, electricity production costs are expected to display a much 
higher daily variability in the future, with average values continuing to be driven by fossil fuel plants, but 
also increasingly by biomass-fired plants. The price of electricity is projected to keep rising, although at a 
smaller pace that observed by the historical trends (Section 2) and is expected to increase by another 10% 
compared to 2020, with total energy-related costs increasing by 22% in the same period. Compared to all 
mid-term scenarios, the EUCO3232.5 scenario requires the largest amount of investments by 2030, with 
solar PV and wind power capacities projected to continue dominating new investments, accounting for 
roughly 90% of new installed capacity between 2015 and 2030 (Figure 10). The scenarios project a 
significant decrease in fossil-fuel-fired power capacities (-92%) and a nearly 10% drop in nuclear and 
natural gas power capacities by 2030, since it is projected that increases in electricity needs would be 
satisfied by achieving the RES 2030 targets. This is expected as the current gas-fired power plant fleet is 
relatively young and would still be operational by 2030 (European Commission, 2019b). 
 
                                                     
15 The analysis is not directly comparable with the historical figures discussed in Section 3 as the modelling focused 
on trends and relative changes and only average values were included in the technical reports in constant EUR of the 
year 2013. In addition, the costs for storage and additional interconnections are not accounted for in the projections.  
16 Projections are similar to those of the Central Scenario developed by the Commission’s JRC energy model 





Figure 11: Mid-term projections (in 2030) of the energy related CO2 emissions by sector in the EU28 [estimated based on data 
from (Capros et al., 2016; E3MLab, 2019)] 
Table 2: Mid-term projections (in 2030) of the electricity and energy-related costs in the EU28 [based on data from (Capros et al., 
2016; E3MLab, 2019)] 
  
* Includes the capital, operating expenditures and efficiency investment costs, excluding costs related to auctioned emissions. Capital expenditures and energy 
efficiency investment costs have been discounted at a 10% rate. 
 
Analysing the potential medium-term implications of an policy pathway of low social acceptance for 
nuclear power as compared to a pathway of high social acceptance (FTI Consulting, 2018), indicates that 
an early closure of NPPs closure and limited nuclear investments would trigger an additional increase in 
electricity prices of 20 EUR/MWh in the medium-term. This is associated with the increased use of gas- 
and coal-fired plants that set wholesale prices in the mid-term, whereas the losses in end-user savings17 
are estimated at 206 billion EUR’17 (undiscounted), because cheaper nuclear baseload is replaced by 
more expensive gas and coal generation. In terms of capital investments, although temporary gains are 
                                                     
17 The end-user costs include all costs associate with providing electricity at the end point (electricity generation 

















































































Average Cost of Gross Electricity 
Generation (€'13/MWh)
65 65 94 93 91 89 3,8 3,7 -0,4 -0,5
Average Price of Electricity in 
Final demand sectors (€'13/MWh)
136 136 153 151 161 163 1,2 1,1 0,5 0,7
Total energy-related costs* (in 
billion €13)
1468 1467,9 1791 1782,9 2032 2166,6 2,0 2,0 1,3 2,0
    as % of GDP 11,4 11,4 12,3 12,3 12,2 13,0
2010 2020 2030
'10-'20 '20-'30
* Includes the c pital, operating expenditures a d efficiency investment cost , exclu ing costs related t  auctioned 
emissions. Capital expenditures and energy efficiency investment costs have been discounted at a 10% rate.
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expected in the medium term due to the lack of commissioning and retrofitting of NPPs, these are 
projected to be outweighed in the long-term and will therefore be discussed in the subsection below18. 
 
Potential Socio-economic Externalities 
Rough estimates of possible medium-term implications with respect to externalities indicate that an early 
closure of nuclear power plants could translate into a missed opportunity to create 204’000 high skilled 
job-years in the nuclear generation sector by 2030 in the EU, as nuclear power is the most job intensive 
technology in terms of direct employment per site and the second most direct job intensive technology 
(i.e. 0.5 Jobs/MW based on (NEA, 2018)). Moreover, by replacing nuclear power with less energy-dense 
power technologies, could result in land-use19 losses of approximately 2852 km2 by 2030, an area almost 
equivalent to the total area of Luxembourg. Finally, the increase in additional thermal generation in order 
to compensate for limiting low-carbon nuclear power generation, could exacerbate EU’s air pollution by 
almost 10 Mt of SOx and NOx emissions, and 3230kt of PM by 2030.  
Future investments beyond 2030 depend on the assumed lifetimes of the current power plants and as 
already mentioned, the majority of the current power plant fleet would still be operational by 2030. In the 
long-term, the influence of policy pathways on the power mix would become more evident, since a 
substantial part of the current power plants (about 1/3 of the capacity installed prior to 2005) would reach 
the end of their lifetime operation between 2030 and 2040. This means that a faster pace of phase-out 
policies with deeper decarbonisation and electrification, could substantially change investment needs, and 
different policy routes could have a varying-level of impact on the future technology deployment, while at 
the same time, most of the assumed techno-economic developments take effect, as scenarios presume 
storage and CCS technologies to become cost effective from 2040 onwards (Capros et al., 2016; Simoes 
et al., 2017). These changes are expected to trigger rapid investments that, depending on the policy 




                                                     
18 This applies also to flexible sources, i.e. batteries and long-term storage including P2G, which the models assume 
to be cost-effective after 2035-2040, as well as grid and balancing costs, which appear after 2030 (Capros et al., 
2016). 
19 Land-use costs are difficult to be estimated and are approximated using the geographic footprint. 
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4.2 The 2050 Scenarios and the Role of Nuclear 
Energy Security of Supply and Emissions Reduction 
By 2050, gross inland energy use is projected to show large variations depending on the policy pathway 
followed and the decarbonisation ambition. Compared to the pathway based on existing policy measures 
(i.e. Baseline), on one hand energy use could be lower driven by efficiency developments, electrification, 
the circular economy and by an increased decarbonisation ambition relying on sustainable lifestyle 
changes (i.e. EE, ELEC, CIRC and 1.5LIF). On the other hand it could also be at similar levels (i.e. H2 
and COMBO) or even increase to meet the growing needs for the production of hydrogen and e-fuels (i.e. 
P2X and 1.5TECH) (Figure 12). The Baseline projects the EU to remain a net-energy importer in 2050, 
whereas the EU’s import dependency is expected to improve significantly in all other scenarios, with 
renewables followed by nuclear becoming the prevalent energy resources. Moreover, the higher the 
decarbonisation ambition (i.e. COMBO, 1.5TECH and 1.5LIFE) the higher increase is projected for the 
consumption of renewables and nuclear energy and the lowest for natural gas and other fossil fuels 
(compared to the EUCO3232.5). 
All scenarios project electricity to become the dominant energy fuel by 2050, representing half of the 
final energy demand (Figure 13), however, individual scenario projections on the shares of energy 
technologies in electricity generation are not provided (European Commission, 2018), and so no analysis 
could be performed on the differences in the power-mix and decarbonisation ambition. At the same time, 
discrepancies were found between the reported values for nuclear electricity generation and its share in 
the final energy use that require further clarification before including them in such an analysis.20 
Nevertheless, the power sector is projected to have the most potential, displaying the steepest reduction in 
emissions across all 2050 EC pathways, which is mostly achieved through improved energy efficiency, a 
circular economy and deepening of electrification (i.e. CIRC, EE, ELEC). 
All EC 2050 policy scenarios project a striking increase in installed power capacity compared to 2030, 
which more than doubles in the scenarios achieving 100% reduction in emissions (Figure 14). Similar to 
the mid-term projections, this trend is linked to projected increase in the installed capacities of solar and 
wind power compared to nuclear, that is expected to require massive investments in electricity 
infrastructure and storage technologies, especially in deep decarbonisation pathways and despite adopting 
policies to support energy efficiency, circular economy and sustainable lifestyle choices (i.e. COMBO, 
1.5TECH and 1.5LIFE) (Figure 15). Specifically, and regardless of the EC policy pathway, solar and 
wind power capacities are projected to continue dominating new investments (77-88%), compared to new 
nuclear power capacities (5-7%),16 whereas the highest investment needs in conventional storage (i.e. 
pumped hydro and batteries) would take place in the scenarios assuming less significant development of 
e-fuels (i.e. EE, CIRC and ELEC). 
                                                     
20 Specifically, only an averaged decarbonisation scenario is provided in the supportive data (i.e. across all long-term 
scenarios), where nuclear power shares drop to 13% of electricity production, which is much lower than its projected 
share in the final energy consumption (i.e. 17-19% in Figure 13). On the contrary, the average share of RES in 
electricity generation is projected at 83% of which 69% is wind and solar, and the average fossil-fuel shares is at 4% 




Figure 12: Long-term projections (in 2050) of the gross inland consumption (excluding non-energy uses of energy fuels and the consumption of the energy sector itself) and the net 




Figure 13: Long-term projections (in 2050) of the shares of energy fuels (i.e. resources and carriers) in the final energy use in the 
EU28 [estimated based on data from (European Commission, 2019c)] 
 
 
Figure 14: Long-term projections (in 2050) of the installed generation capacity by technology in the EU28 [estimated based on 




Figure 15: Projections of the (left) new, total, generation capacities by source, including new constructions, life-time extensions, 
refurbishment and retrofitting, and (right) capacities in electricity storage technologies, needed between 2030 and 2050 in the 
EU28 [estimated based on data from (European Commission, 2019c)] 
Analysing the potential long-term implications of a policy pathway of low social acceptance for nuclear 
power as compared to a pathway of high social acceptance (FTI Consulting, 2018) indicates that in order 
to compensate for the potential loss of 114 GW of nuclear capacity, aside from the 25 GW of additional 
thermal capacity already required by 2030, additional investments in alternative technologies equivalent 
to 533 GW between 2020 and 2050 would be required (about 415GW of RES and 93 GW in battery and 
power-to-gas storage). These trends could induce an additional curtailed energy by RES of about 66TWh  
(or 1% of their total power) and give rise to fossil-fuel power generation (+36 % in natural and +18% of 
coal) to ensure security of supply, of which 80% would be consumed by 2030. Moreover, the EU’s power 
system would rely more heavily on yet-to-be-proven storage technologies (European Commission, 
2019e), of which 36 GW would need to be operational already between 2035 and 2040, while at the same 
time risking a higher import dependency on battery materials and generating large volumes of end-of-life 
batteries that currently have an average 10-year lifetime (Bobba et al., 2018). As a result, and despite the 
increased RES penetration, these would translate into a missed opportunity to further reduce CO2 
emissions by 2270Mt that would bring an additional 17% cut in the power sector emissions by 2050 and 
support EU’s path towards clean electrification. Moreover, 95% of the total emission-reduction potential 
occurs by 2030 (see Section 4.1), which is projected to be an important worldwide tipping point for 
limiting worldwide warming to 1.5°C (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018), hence 
justifies the urgency for early action to reach EU’s fullest potential and strengthen its role as a global 
leader in climate action. 
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Decarbonisation Costs   
Depending on the policy pathway, investment costs are projected to increase at a different pace, mostly 
owed to differences in the technology deployment and decarbonisation ambition (Figure 16): the 
1.5TECH pathway would require the largest amount of investments, followed by P2X, COMBO and H2, 
with energy-related costs increasing by 16 to 30% from 2030. Electricity prices however, follow 
diverging trends compared to 2030, forming seemingly three policy scenario groups by 2050: a) 
electricity prices drop with a low decarbonisation ambition, as costs are mitigated by improved efficiency 
and circular economy measures and intensified electrification (i.e. BL, ELEC, CIRC EE), b) electricity 
prices increase moderately (12-19%), either with a high decarbonisation ambition that relies on 
sustainable lifestyle choices (i.e. 1.5LIFE) or with a low decarbonisation ambition that relies on specific 
technological options (H2, P2X, COMBO), or a), and c) electricity prices increase drastically (almost 
50%) with a high decarbonisation ambition that relies extensively on specific technological options, 
including CCS (1.5TECH). 
 
Figure 16: The evolution of the total (left) energy-related costs and (right) price of electricity by scenario up to 2050 in the EU28 
[estimated based on data from (European Commission, 2019c)] 
Analysing the potential long-term implications of a policy pathway of low social acceptance for nuclear 
power as compared to a pathway of high social acceptance (FTI Consulting, 2018) indicates that although 
power prices converge over time, price volatility would increase significantly due to the increased RES 
penetration. In addition, a peak in power-price losses is expected by 2030 (20 EUR/MWh) that could 
hamper the competitiveness of electricity against other energy fuels and slow down the electrification of 
sectors, such as transport. Furthermore, the overall losses for the end-users17 are estimated at 350 billion 
EUR’17 (undiscounted), of which 90% would occur before 2035. Finally, although an early nuclear 
closure and limited investments, would save 75 billion EUR’17 by 2035, a doubling in investment losses 
is expected thereafter, which could result in an overall investment loss of 85 billion EUR’17 between 
2020 and 2050. It is important to note that these economic figures were based on the assumption that the 
nuclear CAPEX would decrease by 37% by 2050, and although end-user costs were shown to be robust to 
changes in the CAPEX reduction, investment costs were highly sensitive (FTI Consulting, 2018), which 
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further justifies the importance of recognising the contribution of nuclear power to decarbonisation and 
planning long-term financial support schemes to leverage the technological benefits of the nuclear power 
sector. 
 
Potential Socio-economic Externalities 
Rough estimates of possible medium-term implications with respect to externalities indicate that an early 
closure of nuclear power plants could translate into a missed opportunity to create 1 million high-skilled 
job-years in the EU nuclear power sector over 2020-2050. In addition early nuclear closure is expected to 
escalate the RES capacity and as a result both transmission & distribution (T&D) costs and balancing 
costs would increase from 2030 onwards: T&D grid costs could rise by €160 billion EUR’17, of which 
almost half (€70 billion EUR’17) are due to offshore grid cost, while balancing costs could rise by 13 
billion EUR’17.Furthermore, this would escalate land-use requirements21to approximately 15790 km2 to 
meet the needs of electricity generation over 2020-2050, which is equivalent to half the area of Belgium. 
Finally, the additional thermal capacity used to compensate the early NPP closure would heighten air 
pollution, of which 95% would occur by 2030 (see Section 4.1). Missing the long-term benefits of 
achieving lower air-pollution levels by 2030 should not be underestimated, as this would be critical point 
for the EU to display its global leadership role in tackling climate change and limiting global warming to 
1.5°C (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). 
  
                                                     
21 Land-use costs are difficult to be estimated and are approximated using the geographic footprint. 
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5 Discussion on Full System Costs of Electricity Generation  
The most common element to compare technology costs is the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE), which 
usually incorporates what can be categorised as internal costs over the operational lifetime of the plant, 
including investment costs, operation and maintenance costs and fuel-cycle costs, taking into account 
discount rates and inflation (Bustreo et al., 2017; D’haeseleer, 2013; NEA, 2018). Here a distinction is 
made for nuclear compared to other electricity generation technologies, as decommissioning, waste 
management and disposal costs are already included in the nuclear LCOE, which are borne by the 
operator and hence reduce profit. In addition, comparisons based on LCOE, commonly represent plant-
level costs excluding the influence of grid-level costs, i.e. transmission and distribution, balancing and 
utilisation (or back-up) costs that organise reliable supply (NEA, 2019), which in the end are born either 
by the grid operator or the end-consumers through taxes or electricity tariffs. Although rough estimates of 
such costs have been discussed in Section Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source 
not found., in order to properly estimate these costs, they would need to be internalised in the costs of 
electricity generation technologies and subsequently in the modelling scenarios. This becomes 
increasingly important as the penetration of variable and intermittent RES in the energy market deepens 
and as electrification of the economy intensifies; especially when the goal is to decarbonise the power 
sector at the least cost. 
Moreover, except for certain taxes such as the CO2 allowances under the ETS, it has been conventional 
practice to neglect the external costs, also known as externalities, of power generation technologies 
(Bickel and Friedrich, 2005; European Commission, 2003). Although accounting for externalities in full 
system costs is not an uncontroversial topic, as it can be understood as an attempt to reduce human-well-
being into a question of euros, electricity generation technologies incur different environmental and social 
external costs, which are borne by the society at large and should therefore be critical indicators in future 
policies and decision making. Drawing attention to these understudied issues could facilitate public 
discussion and policy making by means of integrating the most pressing issues in a meaningful way 
(NEA, 2018) and in the end positively impact the power sector transformation from a socio-economic 
perspective. 
An example is the share of electricity from nuclear fission, which could increase significantly in the 2050 
power mix when incorporating external costs and increasing the decarbonisation ambition (Sangiorgi et 
al., 2019). Looking beyond 2050, a preliminary analysis suggests that nuclear fission power plants could 
also act as bridge for fusion deployment by potentially preventing deep and costly changes to the power 
system, which would thus be ready to accommodate future fusion generation (Cabal et al., 2016). 
Moreover, internalising externalities could also accelerate fusion penetration, even though a higher 
decarbonisation ambition would be a more determinant factor in this case (Cabal et al., 2017b; Entler et 
al., 2018).  
Assessments of the external costs of electricity generation technologies have for instance revealed the 
relatively high external costs of fossil-fuel technologies with respect to human health and climate change 
impacts, but also revealed the depletion of energy resources and nuclear accidents as the most important 
parameters driving costs in the case of fission technologies (Alberici et al., 2014; Cabal et al., 2017a). 
Specifically concerns over risks of accidents and waste management could affect social acceptability and 
the pace of technology deployment, as is the case in many countries with nuclear energy, even though 
comparative risk assessments show that health risks are low for nuclear energy (Bruckner et al., 2014; 
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Hirschberg et al., 2016). It is important to highlight here that, such assessments are highly technology- 
and country-specific and uncertainties in estimates depend on the availability or lack of historical data, as 
is the case with some new technologies (e.g. biogas), or future technologies (e.g. some advanced nuclear 
reactors or fusion technologies). Considering the severity and heterogeneity of energy-related past 
accidents (Hirschberg et al., 2016), there is a need to improve consistency in analysing health impacts (i.e. 
related to mortality and morbidity) across all energy-chain stages for all energy technologies, including 
renewable energy technologies, while taking into consideration not only normal operation but also severe 
accidents and even hypothetical terrorist threats and health crises. Assessing human health-related 
impacts, like accidents and toxicity, across all energy technologies and life-cycle stages in a consistent 
manner would be vital support in managing the political debates around future technological choices and 




6 Conclusions and Policy Implications  
By 2050 and compared to 2018, electricity could double its share in the final energy consumption. 
Electricity will play a crucial role in the decarbonisation and energy transformation in the EU, with the 
scenarios projecting a fully decarbonised power sector by mid-century. This paper has explored the role 
of nuclear in the EU policy pathways towards decarbonisation and energy transformation focusing on the 
power sector and highlighting possible socio-economic implications that could arise when limited social 
acceptability could virtually exclude the provision of nuclear electricity from the future power mix.  
Historical trends reveal that electricity has already become the second most important energy carrier in 
the EU and the most important one for industry and services. Yet, despite having experienced a large drop 
in its emissions over the past decades, it still remains EU’s largest emitter together with heat. At the same 
time, the pace of its decarbonisation has been slower than the rate of increase of low-carbon electricity 
capacity, as a result of the vast majority of new investments being dedicated to new variable and 
intermittent RES capacities that need four times the installed capacity of nuclear power to produce the 
same amount of low-carbon electricity. In addition, electricity has held the largest share of energy-related 
expenditures in EU households. Retail prices grew by almost 20% for households and small and medium-
sized industries within the past decade, largely owed to the rise in taxes to support RES and CHP. 
Electricity production prices were also influenced by RES subsidies that increased their volatility as a 
result of variations in the generation mix and the marginal costs of generation technologies, which were 
dominated by the higher coal and natural gas prices. 
The EC decarbonisation scenarios reflecting closely the current policy framework, projects electricity to 
become the second most important source of emissions by 2030 and the share of low-carbon electricity is 
projected to increase by another 30%. However this would require a remarkable 125% increase in low-
carbon power capacity compared to 2017 as a result investments continuing to be dominated by variable 
and intermittent RES technologies. On the contrary, nuclear capacity would drop by 10% for the first time 
since 1990, considering the Member States’ explicit phase-out policies and ongoing projects at the time of 
the scenario modelling. The variability of electricity production costs is projected to increase further and 
retail prices to rise by approximately another 10% compared to 2020. Between 2030 and 2040, a 
substantial change in electricity infrastructure investments is expected as a large part of the current EU 
power plants would reach the end of their lifetime operation. The EC 2050 scenarios, project 
electrification to deepen with increases in decarbonisation ambition and expect a doubling in power 
capacity investments, continuing to be dominated by variable and intermittent RES technologies, whereas 
investments in new nuclear power capacities would account for 6%. The overall investments costs are 
projected to grow even further, particularly in scenarios with a higher deployment of hydrogen and e-fuels 
that would trigger another rise in electricity prices, even though impacts could be partially mitigated by 
improved energy efficiency, circular economy and sustainable lifestyle changes to lower consumption. 
An alternative scenario where nuclear phase-out policies evolve at a faster pace, would bring the 2050 
nuclear power capacity to about 25% of the current levels (36GW), resulting in an additional increase in 
mid-term investments for variable and intermittent RES and yet-to-be-proven storage technologies, but 
more importantly for carbon-intensive units (i.e. natural gas and coal). This would thus risk carbon lock-
in, stranded assets and potentially heighten EU’s energy and material dependence for the coming decades. 
Compared to a scenario where NPP deployment is not constrained, an early nuclear closure would 
represent a missed opportunity to cut the power sector CO2 emissions by an extra 17% by 2030 and 
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further boost EU’s path towards carbon-free electrification and long-term decarbonisation, putting an 
upward pressure on EU ETS prices and end-user costs. Indeed, although electricity prices would converge 
in the long-term, if nuclear baseload phase-out is intensified, power price losses are projected to peak by 
2030, which could hamper the competitiveness of electricity against other energy fuels and slow down the 
electrification of sectors, such as transport. This underlines the urgency for considering long-term 
economic benefits of lifting restrictions to nuclear power generation that would largely depend on an 
assumed reduction in the nuclear CAPEX by 2050. Consequently, among the factors that will influence 
the future role of nuclear in the power mix is not only the ability to be flexible and appropriately located 
throughout Europe, but also achieve future cost reductions, reactor design and material improvements 
(e.g. Small Modular Reactors, High Temperature Reactors), as well as design decarbonisation policy 
actions that recognise the environmental and societal benefits of all low-carbon energy technologies while 
ensuring a level-playing field across low-carbon technologies. The contribution of nuclear power towards 
decarbonising the power sector is substantial. Long-term financial support schemes to promote research 
and technological innovation would allow to leverage its technological benefits and support EU’s climate 
and energy targets. As recommended by authors (Buongiorno et al., 2019), market-oriented economies 
like the European Union should be able to compete with e.g. in China and Russia to promote 
technological advancement and investments, with governments adopting an important, yet more limited, 
role in the development and deployment of nuclear technologies, which could involve establishing sites 
where companies could test the operation of prototype reactors for regulatory licensing, as well as 
establish funding programs around prototype testing. The commercial deployment of advanced reactor 
designs is in the hand of industrial actors and national authorities. 
Moreover, decarbonisation exercises evaluating power system costs, assess inconsistently the cost 
elements across generation technologies and energy-chain stages, and often concentrate on plant-level 
costs, while disregarding grid-level costs and social and environmental implications, even though these 
costs are still paid by the society at large. Socio-economic issues that could arise from the energy 
transition could be with respect to the security of energy supply and import dependency, as well as 
possible risks of carbon lock-in and issues related to the availability of land, to public acceptance, which 
could develop as electrification deepens, hindering EU’s long-term decarbonisation transition and putting 
an upwards pressure on end-user costs. A full-system-costs approach could have positive impacts on the 
long-term socio-economic efficiency of the power sector, while looking beyond 2050, it could facilitate 
fusion penetration by potentially preventing deep and costly changes to the power system. Incorporating 
full system costs in future assessments of power-sector transition is especially relevant for technologies 
most sensitive to policy routes, such as nuclear energy technologies, whose future technological progress 
and deployment pace is shown to be constrained by social acceptability in many countries, which in turn 
influence the pace of technology development and cost reduction through economies of scale, thus having 
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9 Terms and Acronyms 
BECCS Bio-energy with carbon capture and storage. 
CAPEX Capital Expenditures. 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage technologies. 
CHP Combined Heat and Power. 
EC European Commission. 
e-fuels Are synthetic fuels produced from decarbonised electricity, according to 
COM(2018) 773. 
Energy carrier According to ISO 13600:1997, it is a "substance or phenomenon that can 
be used to produce mechanical work or heat or to operate chemical or 
physical processes." It is produced from a primary energy source. 
Energy resource Refers to a primary energy resource, a.k.a. natural resource which 
according to ISO 13600:1997 is a "substance or phenomenon appearing 
in nature which can be used as input to the technosphere." It has not been 
not subjected to any human engineered conversion process. 
ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity. 
ESR Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) establishes binding annual greenhouse 
gas emission targets for Member States up to 2030 for most sectors not 
included in the EU ETS, such as transport, buildings, agriculture and 
waste. 
EU ETS The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is EU's greenhouse gas 
emissions trading scheme, covering the sectors of power and heat 
generation, energy-intensive industry and commercial aviation. 
EU28  Also referred to in the text as EU, is the European Union of 28 Member 
States. 
Eurostat European statistics, the statistical office of the European Union. 
Final energy 
consumption 
The total energy consumed by end users, excluding the consumption of 
the energy sector itself (in tonnes of oil equivalent). 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (US$ or EUR). 
Gen-IV Generation IV nuclear reactors. 
GHG Greenhouse gases covered by the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, which are 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6), and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) (in CO2e). 
Gross electricity 
generation 
The amount of electricity produced over a period of time, i.e. the 
electricity measured at the outlet of the main transformers, plus the 
amount of electricity used in the plant auxiliaries and in the transformers 
(in Watt hour). 
Gross inland energy 
consumption 
Abbreviated as gross inland consumption, represents the quantity of 
energy necessary to satisfy the total energy demand of a country or 
region (i.e. inland consumption), including the consumption of the 
energy sector itself, losses during transformation and distribution of 
energy, and the final consumption by end users. It excludes energy fuels 
provided to international maritime bunkers (in tonnes of oil equivalent).  
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IEA International Energy Agency. 
Import dependency Also known as energy import rate, is defined as the net energy imports 
(i.e. imports minus exports) divided by the gross inland energy 
consumption plus fuel supplied to international maritime bunkers (in %).  
Installed power 
capacity 
Also used as generation capacity, is the maximum output of electricity 
that a generator can produce under ideal conditions including the 
consumption of power stations' auxiliary services and transformers (in 
Watt).  
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
LCOE Levelised Cost Of Electricity. 
Load factor Electricity generated over maximum potential generation based on net 
power capacity (in %). 
LULUCF Land use, land-use change, and forestry. 
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency. 
Net energy imports The amount of energy imports minus the amount of energy exports 
expressed in tonnes of oil equivalent (in tonnes of oil equivalent). 
Net-generation 
capacity 
Also used as net-power capacity, is the installed power capacity 
excluding the consumption of power stations' auxiliary services and 
transformers (in Watt). Gross-electricity generation is defined as the 
amount of electricity produced over a period of time, i.e. the electricity 
measured at the outlet of the main transformers, plus the amount of 
electricity used in the plant auxiliaries and in the transformers (in Watt-
hour). 
NOx Nitrogen oxides. 
NPP Nuclear power plant. 
OPEX Operational expenditures. 
PM Particulate matter (in thousand tonnes, kt). 
Primary energy use Also, primary energy consumption, measures the total energy demand of 
a country or region, including the consumption of the energy sector itself, 
losses during transformation and distribution of energy, and the final 
consumption by end users. It excludes energy fuels used for non-energy 
purposes (e.g. petroleum used for producing plastics) (in tonnes of oil 
equivalent). 
RES Renewable Energy Sources. 
SMR Small modular reactors, a type of nuclear fission reactor that is smaller 
than conventional reactors, allowing to bypass financial and safety 
barriers. 
SOx Sulphur oxides (in Megatonnes, Mt). 
 
